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politicians influences firm investment decisions more after the recent anti-corruption campaign, for 
bribing firms and for firms in more corrupt regions. These results are robust to alternative measurements 




Pan, X. & Tian, G. (2017). Political connections and corporate investments: Evidence from the recent anti-
corruption campaign in China. Journal of Banking and Finance, Online First 1-15. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/1148 
1 
 
Political connections and corporate investments: Evidence 










 School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of Wollongong, Australia 
 
2




Taking advantage of corruption scandals in China, we construct a natural experiment and 
identify the ousting of corrupt politicians, and firms connected with them through bribery and 
personal relationships (event firms). We find that the investment expenditure of event firms 
declines significantly after the ousting of the politicians compared with that of non-event 
firms, especially for non-SOEs. We also find that, after the ousting of the politicians, 
investment efficiency improves for event SOEs, but declines for event non-SOEs, compared 
with their non-event counterparts. We also document that the ousting of the politicians 
influences firm investment decisions more after the recent anti-corruption campaign, for 
bribing firms and for firms in more corrupt regions. These results are robust to alternative 
measurements of key variables and specifications.   
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The existing literature has documented that political connections provide valuable 
resources for firms, in terms of easy access to external finance and more relationship-based 
contracts (Claessens et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014), which in 
turn can affect firms’ investment decisions (Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 2005). On the 
one hand, political connections can help mitigate the problems caused by financial constraints 
and increase the capital available for firm investment activities, which addresses the problem 
of under-investment (Xu et al., 2011). However, access to more external capital derived from 
political connections may also encourage firms to engage in sub-optimal investments. On the 
other hand, firms’ political connections may indicate severe government intervention and 
distort firms’ ultimate objectives. Thus, to achieve social or political objectives favoured by 
the government, firms may be forced to invest in unprofitable but politically favoured 
projects, which in turn leads to investment inefficiency (Chen et al., 2011b). Therefore, the 
influence of political connections on firm investment decisions is mixed and needs further 
exploration.   
The existing studies usually examine the influence of political connections using a static 
research setup, namely comparing the cross-sectional variation of economic outcomes 
between firms with and without political connections. However, it is unclear how these 
economic outcomes respond to a change in political connections when firms are associated 
with an ousted official. The answer to this issue is of particular importance, as changes in 
political connections are likely to affect the incentives and actions of firms, and provide 
greater insight into the dynamic responses that firms have in reacting to shifts in the political 
regime. In this study, we take advantage of corruption scandals in China to examine how 
political capital established through corruption shapes corporate investment decisions. 
Specifically, we take advantage of ongoing corruption scandals and the recent anti-corruption 
campaign initiated in China to construct a natural experiment that identifies the termination 
of political ties. The identification of termination of political ties may alleviate the 
endogeneity issue to some extent. Although there is only one ruling party under the current 
Chinese political system, several different political cliques co-exist and compete fiercely with 
each other. Such scandals, which lead to the ousting of high-level corrupt bureaucrats, are 
commonly used by one clique when attempting to eliminate a competing clique (Hung et al., 
2015). These scandals, therefore, are non-systemic and mainly driven by political factors, and 
they are unlikely to be foreseen by the market (Fan et al., 2008). To conduct an empirical 
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analysis at the firm level, we identify firms that have been involved in these scandals and 
experienced the termination of political ties (termed event firms). Specifically, these event 
firms are those firms whose manager/director either bribed corrupt bureaucrats (bribing firms) 
or was connected with corrupt bureaucrats through personal relationship (connected firms)
1
. 
Therefore, we explicitly examine how corporate investment decisions respond to the 
termination of political ties, which allows us to identify the causal effect of political 
connections established through corruption on corporate investment decision.  
The Chinese market is also a convenient and appropriate setting for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the Chinese economy is dominated by the government, which maintains 
control over key resources and decides on the allocation of resources. This environment 
directly results in the availability of huge economic rents, so that firms/individuals have 
strong incentives to bribe government officers to establish a close relationship with the 
government, in exchange for the creation and allocation of rents and government protection 
(Cai et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011a). However, existing studies put forward two views, 
finding that corruption can either ‘sand’ or ‘grease’ the wheel of the economic growth 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Aidt et al., 2008). Based on these mixed results, the influence of 
political connections formed through corruption remains an empirical question.  
Secondly, the co-existence of both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs 
provides another unique institutional environment for examining the influence of political 
connections on corporate investment decisions. On the one hand, SOEs are controlled by the 
government, and thus are naturally connected with the government; so that their political 
connections may not provide additional benefits for SOEs. On the other hand, non-SOEs 
have incentives to establish political connections and take advantage of these connections; 
thus, political connections have been documented to be valuable for non-SOEs in areas such 
as financing and investment. 
Consistent with our predictions, our empirical results show that investment expenditures 
made by event firms decreased more significantly relative to non-event firms, following the 
ousting of corrupt government officers; and that this is more pronounced for non-SOEs. We 
also find that, following the ousting of corrupt officers, the investment efficiency of event 
SOEs is rectified and improves significantly relative to that of non-event SOEs; while the 
investment efficiency of event non-SOEs deteriorates significantly more than that of non-
                                                          
1
 An example of a bribing firm is Zi Xin Yao Ye (Stock code: 002118), and the corrupt bureaucrat is Mr Tian 
Xueren, the former vice-governor of Jilin Province, who was arrested in July 2012. During his term of office 
from 1995 to 2011, Mr Tian received a large bribe from the Chairman of Zi Xin Yao Ye, Mr Guo Chunsheng, 
which amounted to about 12.17 million RMB.   
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event non-SOEs. These results are robust to alternative measurement of key variables, 
alternative explanations, alternative specifications, and alternative samples.  
We also document that these results are more pronounced after the recent anti-corruption 
campaign, for bribing firms and for firms in more corrupt regions. Our further analysis, on 
the change of firm performance, managerial pay-performance relationship and perks, and 
stock market reactions, provides additional evidence to support our arguments and main 
hypotheses. 
However, some caution is needed when interpreting our results. One potential concern is 
that changes in corporate investment decisions may only be visible over longer horizons. 
Because of limitations on the availability of data, we are unable to collect corporate 
investment information over long horizons for particular events (those occurring after 2013).   
Our study contributes to the literature on political connections in several ways. Firstly, 
from the empirical perspective, we improve the traditional measurements of political 
connections used by most existing studies, which define political connections as having 
executives with previous working experience in governments: our politically connected firms 
(those event firms we defined earlier) include those firms that pay bribes to government 
officers and executives who have personal relationships with government officers. Our 
measurements are more objective, in identifying whether a connection between firms and 
politicians exists and whether this connection is exploited to extract rents. Secondly, the 
economic implications of political connections have been examined extensively, albeit with 
mixed evidence. In particular, political connections may increase firm value/performance 
(Claessens et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2012), through easy access to 
external finance at a lower cost (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Cleassens et al., 2008; Li et 
al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014); while it has also been 
documented that they are associated with lower performance (Fan et al., 2007; Faccio, 2010) 
and higher interest rates (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Our study proposes that corporate investment 
is the channel through which political connections can affect firm performance; and that this 
depends heavily on the type of ultimate owner and potential costs incurred through rent 
seeking.  
This study also contributes to the literature on corruption and rent seeking. Corruption is 
a global phenomenon and prevalent in forming political connections. Some studies contend 
that corruption is the main obstacle to economic development (Gaviria, 2002; Asiedu and 
Freeman, 2009); while others argue that corruption is less detrimental in environments with 
ineffective institutions (Meon and Weill, 2010; Cai et al., 2011). Our investigation 
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complements the notion that corruption can either hinder or facilitate economic development. 
In particular, private benefits from bribing government officers are consumed by SOE 
managers for their personal objectives, which incurs substantial costs and reduces investment 
efficiency and firm performance. However, benefits for shareholders from bribery may 
outweigh the cost of bribery in non-SOEs, which improves investment efficiency and firm 
performance. Our findings are also consistent with the broad range of economic literature 
regarding the role played by political rent seeking in explaining firm behaviour and growth 
(Morck et al., 2005).  
Moreover, despite the importance of the corruption effect at the firm level reported by 
several international surveys
2
, most academic studies typically take the perspective of data 
analysis at the country level (Mauro, 1995; Meon and Sekkat, 2005). By exploiting firm-level 
data, we usefully expand the evidence on the effect of corruption on corporate investment 
decisions, which complements previous studies.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the corruption 
events and recent anti-corruption campaign, and the economic environment surrounding the 
corruption events. Section 3 discusses causal effects of identifying political connections, 
elaborates the construction of our sample firms, as well as control firms, assembles the 
empirical data, and introduces our empirical models. Section 4 presents the results of our 
analysis. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Corruption and the anti-corruption campaign in China 
Corruption is acknowledged to be an international phenomenon, especially in emerging 
markets with underdeveloped financial systems, weak legal protection of investors, and 
severe government intervention. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the structure of 
government institutions and the political process are very important determinants of the level 
of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not effectively control their agencies 
experience very high levels of corruption. International evidence confirms that political 
decentralization could impede coordination and exacerbate incentives for officials at various 
levels to ‘overgraze’ the common bribe base (Fan et al., 2009); and state ownership of the 
media is associated with high levels of bank corruption (Houston et al., 2011). In China, 
despite more than three decades of economic reforms and fiscal decentralization, both central 
and local governments still exercise absolute control over the institutional and financial 
                                                          
2
 For example, the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by World Bank.  
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systems, and corruption acts as the proverbial ‘grease’ for the bureaucratic ‘wheels’ of an 
otherwise unmotivated banking system (Chen et al., 2013). Among the corruption cases we 
identified in this study (discussed later in Section 3), a close connection has been established 
through corruption for facilitating firms’ access to better investment opportunities. For 
example, Mr Liu Zhuozhi, the former vice-secretary of Neimenggu province, was arrested on 
the 15
th
 December 2010. During the period of his incumbency, he accepted bribes of more 
than 8 million RMB, and in exchange included corrupt firms on the list of qualified bidders, 
and even facilitated the success of these firms in winning some merger and acquisition 
projects as well as a set of subsequent local projects. In addition, Mr Huang Yao, the former 
President of CPPCC in Guizhou province, was arrested on the 22
nd
 February 2010. Before 
being ousted, he took more than 9 million RMB in bribes in exchange for awarding a set of 
projects to the bribing firms.  
According to a Transparency International survey in 2003, China’s Corruption 
Perception Index ranked in the lower half, with a score of 3.5 (on a scale of 1 to 10, with 
lower scores indicating greater public perception of corruption); while in 2015 this score 
(now calculated on a scale of 1 to 100) increased to 37, it was still in the lower half. 
Moreover, China ranks 83 out of 168 countries on the Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International. La Porta et al. (2004) also report that China is among the worst 
countries in terms of political freedom and the protection of property rights.  
As corruption is expected to be an obstacle to economic growth that cannot be effectively 
eradicated completely, anti-corruption has continued to be a theme for China; and anti-
corruption campaigns were put forward in order to restore economic growth and correct the 
consequences of corruption. Specifically, based on the official records of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, over the past three 
decades to the end of 2011, more than 4.2 million party members were punished by 
Communist Party law, among them 465 being officials at the level of vice-minister or above. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the 18
th
 National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
on the 14
th
 November 2012, when President Xi formally took office, the boldest and most 
serious anti-corruption campaign was initiated, which has since brought down a large number 
of Communist Party officials. By the end of 2013, more than 182,000 party officials at 
various levels had been investigated or arrested, including 43 at the level of vice-minister or 
above.  
2.2 Hypothesis development 
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The Chinese economy is a hybrid of central planning and market-based activities, where 
the government controls the key resources that are essential for the corporate sector. In this 
sense, politicians can explicitly and implicitly shape the incentives and decisions of economic 
entities, by directly controlling the activity of SOEs through government ownership, and 
indirectly controlling the behaviour of non-SOEs through soft channels (such as regulations, 
licences, and social and political networks) (Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). Thus, in order to be 
treated preferentially by the government and gain a competitive advantage, firms have strong 
incentives to stay close to the government through bribing politicians or forming personal 
relationships in exchange for contracts and opportunities for private illicit gains (Ngo, 2008; 
Cai et al., 2011). This suggests that, all else being equal, firms that benefit from political 
connections may expand their activities increasing investments.  
Moreover, existing theory predicts that corporate investment will be hampered due to the 
lack of sufficient financing, which would be particularly severe for financially constrained 
firms (Duchin et al., 2010). Political connections are effective in helping firms to overcome 
the disadvantages of these financing constraints, and are significantly associated with more 
domestic financing or higher levels of leverage (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens 
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). Thus, close 
connections with the government reduce their financial constraints and may facilitate firms to 
invest more in building their empires.  
Nevertheless, to be consistent with the theoretical framework proposed and discussed by 
Wu et al. (2012), we argue that the influence of political connections is expected to be 
different for SOEs and non-SOEs. In particular, SOEs are naturally connected with the 
government through their government ownership, and are more likely to be favoured by the 
government in terms of financing and investments (Brandt and Li, 2003). In this case, 
political connections in SOEs do not provide additional benefits in the form of more 
investment activities. However, non-SOEs have strong incentives to cultivate and maintain 
close connections with the government, which is helpful in overcoming institutional failure 
and ideological discrimination against private ownership; and political connections have been 
documented to be valuable for non-SOEs in areas such as financing and investments (Li et al., 
2008; Xu et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2016). If the market expects that rent 
seeking through political connections leads to benefits for individual firms with respect to 
investment activities, the competitive advantage for politically connected firms in entering 
into more investment activities should disappear after the termination of their political 
connections. Thus, based on our above discussion, we expect that the ousting of connected 
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bureaucrats will remove the valuable political capital from non-SOEs, but not necessarily 
from SOEs. We therefore construct the following hypothesis: 
H1: After the ousting of corrupt government officers, politically connected firms 
experience a significant decline in investment relative to non-politically connected firms in 
non-SOEs, but not in SOEs. 
Although both SOEs and non-SOEs may reduce their respective investment expenditures 
after the termination of political connections, a natural question that needs to be answered is 
how firm investment efficiency changes, and how this change varies between SOEs and non-
SOEs. In SOEs, if managers have connections with government bureaucrats through bribery 
or personal relationships, there is a potential for collusion between government officials and 
SOE managers, because connected SOE managers have more incentives to extract private 
benefits rather than to maximize shareholder value through either bribery or personal 
relationships. In this circumstance, SOE managers have stronger incentives for self-dealing 
behaviour and pursuit of private benefits (such as political promotion, perks and inflated 
compensation, or taking bribes in the course of obtaining more investment projects). 
Moreover, in exchange for this self-dealing behaviour, SOE managers also need to satisfy 
government officials and help in accomplishing social or political objectives that are not 
necessarily in the best interests of minority shareholders but are preferred by government 
officials. These causes, then, suggest that excessive investments in SOEs are sub-optimal 
with low efficiency, and may not provide any additional benefit to shareholders. In addition, 
soft budget lending resulting from political connections may further exacerbate inefficient 
investment activities, which in turn encourage these SOEs to invest more for personal 
objectives, rather than for economic objectives (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). Once the potential 
collusion or the political connections are terminated, the distorted investment efficiency will 
be rectified, leading to improved investment efficiency. 
On the other hand, unlike the case of SOEs, the dominant objective of non-SOEs is to 
maximize shareholder value. Thus, we argue that non-SOEs are likely to be involved in 
maintaining political connections only if those connections bring economic benefits, 
including profitable investment opportunities. This is particularly important in China, where 
key investment projects are still regulated and controlled by the government and political 
connections in non-SOEs are helpful in seeking profitable investment projects and expediting 
the approval process. The termination of political connections eliminates this advantage, 
which will reduce investment efficiency in politically connected non-SOEs. Therefore, we 
construct the following hypothesis: 
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H2: After the ousting of corrupt government officers, investment becomes more efficient 
for politically connected SOEs relative to non-politically connected SOEs, and less efficient 
for politically connected non-SOEs relative to non-politically connected non-SOEs.  
We extend our previous hypotheses by focusing on the recent anti-corruption campaign 
initiated in China. Since this anti-corruption campaign, more government officials involved 
in misconduct have been arrested or are under investigation; and this campaign has placed 
substantial pressure and constraints on the behaviour of incumbent officials. To this extent, 
the vigorous enforcement of the anti-corruption campaign should reinforce the influence of 
the termination of political ties, and provides an even stronger experiment that allows us to 
further identify the causal effect of political power on corporate investment decisions, as this 
campaign was largely unanticipated by the market. Thus, we formulate the following 
hypothesis:   
H3: The changes in investment and investment efficiency for politically connected firms 
after the ousting of corrupt government officers are more significant since the recent anti-
corruption campaign. 
3. Identification, sample and methodology 
3.1 Identification of the influence of political connections  
The endogeneity issue of political connections is the main concern for empirical study, 
which is typical for cross-sectional studies. The ideal test would be applying a natural 
experiment that allows us to avoid the endogeneity issue as well as unobserved confounding 
factors. Specifically, we collect a sample of corruption scandals involving high-level 
government officers (provincial level and above) in China, because these corruption scandals 
are exogenous to the firms and less likely to be anticipated by the market. In particular, we 
compare the investment and investment efficiency of SOE event firms and non-SOE event 
firms before and after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats.     
We also consider the effects of regional variation in corruption. China’s reform process 
shows significant characteristics of an uneven distribution of institutional development and 
corruption levels across different provinces (Chen et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2012). As 
government officials have a more significant inclination towards bribing firms within the 
regions with severe corruption, we expect the influence of political connections on corporate 
investment decisions to be stronger in the regions with a weak institutional environment, 
including weak legal enforcement.  
Finally, we examine the market reaction to these corruption scandals, and change in firm 
performance before and after the ousting of corrupt bureaucrats, to complement our main 
10 
 
analysis results. Our arguments predict that corruption creates private benefits, which are 
obtained by SOE managers, and deteriorates SOE firm performance, while it adds substantial 
value to non-SOEs. In this sense, investors should react positively towards the ousting of 
politicians in the case of SOEs, but negatively in the case of non-SOEs.    
3.2 Sample of high-level corruption cases  
To construct a natural experiment, we assemble 104 corruption cases from the beginning 
of 2003 to the third quarter of 2014. In particular, we focus on high-level government officers 
for the following reasons. Firstly, these cases usually have larger and more substantial 
impacts on the corporate sector and the regional economy than general corruption cases have. 
Secondly, these cases usually attract greater public attention, so that the disclosure of 
information about these cases is better. Moreover, our identification of high-level corruption 
cases is also consistent with existing studies in China, which also focus on cases at the 
provincial level or above (Li and Zhou, 2005; Fan et al., 2008; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). 
Thirdly, these cases may mitigate the potential endogeneity concern that corporate investment 
decisions may cause the enforcement of anti-corruption laws, because these cases are 
political and less likely to result from their facilitating investment activities to event firms. 
Data on these corruption cases are hand-collected by searching information published by the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (CCDI) and 
supplemented by Baidu (www.baidu.com) and Google (www.google.com) web searches.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 104 high-level corruption cases, by section and by 
year, which occurred during our sample period in China. These corruption cases are not 
concentrated in time up to 2012, with each calendar year being associated with at least five 
corruption events. Years 2013 and 2014 are associated with a higher number of corruption 
events, which corresponds to the anti-corruption policy enforced by the National Congress of 




 November 2012), indicating that this new 
anti-corruption drive is a good natural experiment for examining the effect of political 
connections on corporate investment decisions. In addition, corruption events are not strictly 
concentrated in categories. In particular, the central government and affiliated state entities 
have experienced 23 corruption events, which accounts for 22.12% of total events over our 
sample period. Four corruption events come from banks. The most common scenarios of 
high-level corruption involve officers from provincial governments (77 out of 104).   
Table 1.  
Distribution of provincial-level or above corruption cases by section and by year. 
This table presents the distribution of corruption cases in China by category and year over the sample 
period from the beginning of 2003 to the third quarter of 2014. Central refers to the departments of the central 
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government; Banks include the People’s Bank of China, the big four banks and the three policy banks; 
Provincial officers include (Vice-) Secretary, (Vice-) Governor, (Vice-) Chairman of both provincial NPC and 
CPPCC.  
 Central  Banks Provincial Total 
2003 1 1 5 7 
2004 2 1 6 9 
2005 0 1 7 8 
2006 2 0 4 6 
2007 0 0 5 5 
2008 1 0 4 5 
2009 4 1 4 9 
2010 1 0 3 4 
2011 3 0 2 5 
2012 1 0 4 5 
2013 5 0 12 17 
2014 (by September) 3 0 21 24 
Total 23 4 77 104 
 
3.3 Sample of bribing firms and connected firms (event firms) 
To conduct analysis at the firm level, we identify a set of firms that were involved in the 
corruption cases (bribing firms) or connected with the corrupt bureaucrats through either 
family members or friendship (connected firms). To do so, we searched through the 
abovementioned information published by the CCDI, and Baidu and Google. In particular, a 
bribing firm is identified if any of these information sources indicates that the firm’s 
chairman, CEO, controlling owner or board directors has bribed the corrupt bureaucrats. A 
connected firm is identified if any of these information sources indicates that the firm’s 
chairman, CEO, controlling owner or board directors are of the same family as, or friends of, 
the corrupt bureaucrats, or have previous job affiliations with the corrupt bureaucrats. In 
summary, we identify 112 bribing firms and 87 connected firms over our sample period, 
including both unlisted firms and firms listed on the Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong stock 
exchanges. Due to the limitation of data availability, we exclude 18 firms listed on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange and 67 unlisted firms, and thus obtain 62 bribing firms and 52 
connected firms around the time of the ousting of corrupt officers. For ease of discussion, we 
term both bribing firms and connected firms as event firms.   
3.4 Sample construction for empirical analysis 
We employ the matching method to construct our empirical sample, which includes both 
event firms and control firms (non-event firms). For each event firm, a potential match firm is 
any firm that is not identified as a bribing firm or connected firm, from the same province, 
the same industry, and the same board (main board or small and medium board), with the 
same type of ultimate owner (either SOE or non-SOE). From the set of potential matches, we 
select the one with total asset value closest to that of the event firm at the end of each quarter. 
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If no match is found, we release the requirement that both event firms and control firms are 
from the same industry, and repeat the procedure. If still no match is found, we drop this 
event firm. As a result of this procedure, our empirical sample is 110 event firms (62 bribing 
firms and 48 connected firms, and 52 SOEs and 58 non-SOEs) and 110 control firms.  
To construct the sample for empirical analysis, we collect quarterly financial data from 
the third year before to the third year after the corruption event, for both treatment firms and 
control firms. For firms with less than three years of data either before or after the corruption 
event, the available quarterly data is taken in a variable. In particular, all quarterly 
observations used in our empirical analysis are obtained from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which includes 5082 firm-quarter observations. 
Consistent with prior studies, we exclude 224 firm-quarter observations from financial 
industries, 123 firm-quarter observations flagged with ST or *ST, and 213 firm-quarter 
observations with missing information; and finally obtain 4522 firm-quarter observations for 
the following empirical analysis. To remove the influence of outliers, we winsorize the top 
and bottom 1% of all continuous variables for our empirical analysis.  
3.5 Methodology 
In general, a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy is applied for empirical analysis. To 
conduct multivariate analysis of the relationship between political connections and corporate 
investment, we begin with the standard investment regression developed by Fazzari et al. 
(1988) and used by the following studies: Aivazian et al. (2005), Firth et al. (2008), Chen et 















                        




  (1) 
where Investment is firms’ investment expenditures. We follow Chen et al. (2011b) and Xu et 
al. (2011) to measure investment expenditures as the ratio of capital expenditure (cash 
payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets less cash receipts from 
selling these assets) to total assets. An alternative measure, the ratio of net capital expenditure 
(capital expenditure minus depreciation) to total assets (Firth et al., 2008), is considered for 
the robustness tests. Corrupt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bribing firms and connected 
firms, and 0 for other firms. Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period after the 
corrupt bureaucrats were arrested, and 0 for the period before. The interaction term 
Corrupt*Post is added to capture the post-event changes in the investment activities of event 
firms relative to control firms. We test H1 by estimating equation (1) for both SOE and non-
13 
 
SOE subsamples, and expect the coefficients of Corrupt*Post to be significantly negative in 
non-SOEs. Leverage is the ratio of firm total debt to total assets. Q is Tobin’s Q, calculated as 
the sum of market value of tradable shares, book value of non-tradable shares and liabilities, 
divided by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. We calculate the book value of 
non-tradable shares because of their illiquidity, and because they are normally traded at a 
price close to the book value of equity (Chen et al., 2011). If a firm has no non-tradable 
shares, then the book value of non-tradable shares is removed from the calculation of Tobin’s 
Q. Cashflow is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ 
total assets. Sale is the ratio of net sales to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible 
assets to firms’ total assets. Industry and quarterly fixed effects are also included. 
To examine corporate investment efficiency, we follow the method used by Chen et al. 
(2011b) and use the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities to 
measure investment efficiency, and efficient investment is reflected by a close relationship 
between investment expenditure and investment opportunities. In particular, the equation to 
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        (2)  
where Q is measured by Tobin’s Q, which is used as the proxy for investment opportunities. 
We also include quarter and industry dummy variables to control for the time and industry 
fixed effects. All the other variables are defined as in equation (1). We test H2 by estimating 
equation (2) for both SOE and non-SOE subsamples, and expect the coefficients of 
Corrupt*Post*Q to be positive in SOEs and negative in non-SOEs. Table 2 summarizes the 
definitions of all variables used in this study for both univariate and multivariate analysis. 
When estimating the investment-Q relationship in equation (2) to assess investment 
efficiency, we notice an important issue of the measurement error in Tobin’s Q, which has 
been discussed extensively in existing studies
3
. In this case, the ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation method might lead to biased and inconsistent coefficients, and the results become 
unreliable. Therefore, to provide unbiased and consistent estimations of coefficients, we use 
the instrumental variable (IV) approach for estimation (Robert and Whited, 2012). In our 
estimation, we treat Tobin’s Q and its interaction terms with other variables as mismeasured, 
                                                          
3
 Please see, for example, Erickson and Whited (2000) and Robert and Whited (2012) for detailed discussions of 
the measurement error in Tobin’s Q, and the proposed remedies to deal with the measurement error. 
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and use the lagged mismeasured variables as the instruments, following Erickson and Whited 
(2012) and Robert and Whited (2012). However, we admit that the IV approach does not 
necessarily dominate other methods in addressing measurement error, so we use other 
methods to check the robustness of our main results in a later section.        
Table 2  
Variables and definitions 
This table lists the symbols and corresponding definitions of variables. 
Variable  Definitions 
Investment (I) Capital expenditure / Total assets in the current quarter 
Q Tobin’s Q, measured as the sum of market value of tradable shares, book value of 
non-tradable shares and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value of equity and 
liabilities, in the current quarter. If a firm has no non-tradable shares, then the 
book value of non-tradable shares is removed from this calculation.  
Corrupt A dummy variable equal to 1 for event firms and 0 for control firms 
Post A dummy variable equal to 1 for post-event period and 0 otherwise 
Leverage Total debt/Total assets in the current quarter 
Cashflow (Net income + depreciation) / Total assets in the current quarter 
Size Natural log of total assets in the current quarter 
Sale Sales / Total assets in the current quarter 
Tangibility Tangible assets / Total assets in the current quarter 
ROA Net income / Total assets 
Campaign A dummy variable equal to 1 for observations falling after the 18
th
 Congress 
conference and 0 otherwise 
Perk Total perks / Sales 
Lnpay Natural log of the average compensation of top three executives 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics and univariate tests 
 Table 3 presents the summary statistics for investment expenditures, Tobin’s Q, as well 
as other variables used in our study, for the full sample, event firm sample, and control firm 
sample. Before proceeding, the construction of some variables using the data from income 
statements and cash flow statements needs to be noted (these variables include investment 
expenditures, cash flow and sales level, and return on assets). The quarterly data obtained 
from the income statements and cash flow statements of the CSMAR database actually 
records the cash transactions from the beginning of the current year. Thus, we calculate the 
difference between two consecutive quarterly observations within the same year, to figure out 
the cash transactions for a particular quarter. For example, the observations of investment by 
the end of 2013Q2 and 2013Q3 record the investment activities for the first two and three 
quarters in 2013, respectively; so the difference (2013Q3-2013Q2) is actually the investment 
activities for the third quarter of 2013. In our sample, 53% of firms are non-SOEs, and others 
are SOEs. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 3 for the full sample, the average corporate 
investment expenditure level is 2.41%, and the average quarterly Tobin’s Q is 1.84. We also 
present the average leverage ratio as 56.75%, and the mean (median) free cash flow ratio and 
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sales ratio are 1.89% (1.69%) and 15.16% (12.08%), respectively. In Panels B and C, we 
summarize the statistics for both event firm sample and control firm sample, respectively. It 
is clear that the firm sizes are quite similar for both samples, which validates our matching 
procedure. We also observe some differences in other variables between both samples, which 
will be included as control variables in our regression analysis.      
Table 3  
Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of all variables used in our study. Definitions of these variables are 
the same as in Table 2. 
 Mean Median 25% quartile 75% quartile 
Panel A: Full sample 
Investment (I) 2.41% 0.86% 0.22% 2.50% 
Q 1.84 1.36 1.08 2.00 
Leverage 56.75% 52.18% 34.58% 70.36% 
Cashflow 1.89% 1.69% -7.60% 11.90% 
Size 21.68 21.52 20.49 22.51 
Sale 15.16% 12.08% 5.99% 19.75% 
Tangibility 23.22% 18.72% 7.20% 35.13% 
ROA 0.58% 0.47% 0.01% 0.96% 
Perks 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.009 
Lnpay 12.64 12.70 12.13 13.20 
Panel B: Event firm sample 
Investment (I) 2.51% 0.94% 0.25% 2.56% 
Q 1.79 1.35 1.08 1.98 
Leverage 57.37% 52.53% 35.37% 71.45% 
Cashflow 2.27% 1.72% -6.85% 12.40% 
Size 21.70 21.50 20.58 22.59 
Sale 14.64% 11.92% 5.65% 19.67% 
Tangibility 21.75% 17.63% 7.16% 32.12% 
ROA 0.39% 0.28% -0.32% 0.47% 
Perks 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.010 
Lnpay 12.53 12.63 12.09 13.10 
Panel C: Non-event firm sample 
Investment (I) 2.32% 0.78% 0.21% 2.42% 
Q 1.90 1.38 1.09 2.04 
Leverage 56.13% 51.22% 33.16% 69.32% 
Cashflow 1.51% 1.68% -8.62% 11.01% 
Size 21.66 21.55 20.39 22.43 
Sale 15.68% 12.27% 6.08% 20.30% 
Tangibility 24.69% 20.57% 7.26% 37.45% 
ROA 0.77% 0.68% 0.02% 1.23% 
Perks 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.008 
Lnpay 12.75 12.78 12.15 13.31 
 
To provide some empirical evidence to support our hypotheses, we conduct univariate 
tests by comparing the average of corporate investment expenditures between event firms and 
non-event firms for the full sample, SOE sample and non-SOE sample, with the results 
shown in Table 4. In particular, for the event firms in Panel A, the mean values of average 
investment are 3.05% and 1.07% before and after the ousting of corrupt politicians, 
respectively, and the difference is 1.98%, which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.27). 
For the non-event firms, the mean values of investment are 2.74% and 1.06%, respectively, 
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and the difference is 1.68%, significant at the 10% level (t-value is 1.80). In the right bottom 
cell, we report the difference between the changes in investment expenditures for event firms 
and non-event firms. We observe that the difference is 0.30%, which is significant at the 5% 
level (t-value is 2.13). These results suggest that the investment expenditures have been 
reduced significantly after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, which is more pronounced for 
event firms. In Panels B and C, we repeat our comparison to check the changes in investment 
expenditures for both SOE and non-SOE samples. Consistent with the evidence for the full 
sample, the changes in average investment expenditures are higher for event firms for both 
SOE and non-SOE samples. However, the difference of reduction in the investment 
expenditures after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats between event firms and non-event firms 
is significant in non-SOEs at the 1% level, but not in SOEs. Overall, the results from Table 4 
lend support to our hypothesis that, after the ousting of corrupt bureaucrats, investment 
expenditures decline more for event firms than for non-event firms, which is significant for 
non-SOE event firms but not for SOE event firms. These results indicate that political 
connections are effective in facilitating corporate investment, and the termination of 
connections with the government will adversely affect corporate investment.   
Table 4 
Univariate tests 
This table reports the mean values of corporate investment expenditures for the sample of event firms and 
non-event firms before and after the corruption event. Event firms include those firms identified as having 
bribed corrupt government officers and those firms identified as having connections with corrupt government 
officers. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Before the corruption event After the corruption event Difference test (t-value) 
Panel A: Full sample    
Event firms 3.05% 1.07% 1.98%***(3.27) 
Non-event firms 2.74% 1.06% 1.68%*(1.80) 
Difference-in-
difference test (t-value) 
  0.30%**(2.13) 
Panel B: SOE sample    
Event firms 2.98% 1.09% 1.89%**(2.51) 
Non-event firms 2.93% 1.22% 1.71%**(1.97) 
Difference-in-
difference test (t-value) 
  0.18%(0.93) 
Panel C: Non-SOE sample 
Event firms 3.41% 0.89% 2.52%***(3.70) 
Non-event firms 2.49% 0.93% 1.56%(1.35) 
Difference-in-
difference test (t-value) 
  0.94***(2.99) 
 
4.2 Political connections, ultimate owner type and investment expenditures 
In this section, we perform regression analysis to examine whether corporate investment 
decisions change after the corruption event, by estimating equation (1), and report the results 
in Table 5. 
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Column 1 presents the results for the full sample, and columns 2 and 3 present the results 
for both SOE and non-SOE samples. Across three specifications, we observe that the 
estimated coefficients on Corrupt are all positive while insignificant, indicating that the 
average investment expenditures are higher for event firms than non-event firms, while the 
difference is not significant. We also find that the estimated coefficients on Post are all 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% levels. This result suggests that the average 
investment expenditures decline significantly after the termination of political connections, 
which is significant for both SOEs and non-SOEs. We are particularly interested in the 
coefficients of the interaction term Corrupt*Post. In the first column for the full sample, the 
estimated coefficient is -0.04, significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.21), indicating that the 
average investment expenditures decline significantly for event firms after the termination of 
the political connections, compared with non-event firms. When we turn to subsample 
estimations, we observe that the significant coefficient holds for non-SOEs, while it is 
insignificant for SOEs. We also conduct the Chow test to formally examine the significance 
of the difference between the coefficients of the Corrupt*Post for SOEs and non-SOEs. The 
Chow test result shows that the influence of political connection terminations is stronger for 
non-SOEs than for SOEs (F=4.56, p<0.05).  
The results in Table 5 are consistent with our hypothesis H1, that non-SOE event firms 
experience a more significant decline of investment expenditures compared with non-SOE 
non-event firms, while the decline in investment expenditures for SOE event firms is 
insignificantly different from that for SOE non-event firms. This also confirms our argument 
that SOEs are treated preferentially by the government in terms of financing and investment, 
while the success of non-SOEs relies largely on their connections with the government, so 
that the decline in investment is not expected to be significant for SOEs relative to non-SOEs 
after the termination of political connections.   
Table 5 
The effect of political connections on corporate investment expenditures 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
expenditures. Quarterly observations for the event firms and control firms from three years before to three years 
after the event of corruption are applied in the regressions. The dependent variable is corporate investment, 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms 
bribing government officers or connected with the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. Post is a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 for observations of the post-event period, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables 
are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by 
the firm. *, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is corporate investment expenditures 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt 0.02(1.56) 0.01(0.65) 0.03(1.42) 
Post -0.06***(-5.50) -0.03***(-4.16) -0.08***(-4.45) 
Corrupt*Post -0.04**(-2.21) -0.01(-0.62) -0.07**(-2.30) 
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Leverage -0.05***(-5.70) -0.10***(-6.94) -0.05***(-4.79) 
Q 0.07**(2.06) 0.08*(1.80) 0.08(1.43) 
Cashflow 0.37***(4.10) 0.48***(6.22) 0.31**(2.49) 
Size 0.04*(1.77) 0.10***(4.64) 0.04(0.81) 
Sale 0.03(1.40) 0.07***(3.07) 0.01(0.23) 
Tangibility 0.10***(11.82) 0.04***(3.62) 0.11***(10.48) 
Constant 0.08(1.56) -0.04(-0.72) 0.29**(2.25) 
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Chow test  4.56**  
Adjusted R square 0.37 0.23 0.43 
Observations 4522 2128 2394 
 
Among the control variables, we observe signs of all control variables consistent with 
previous studies (Firth et al., 2008, 2012; Chen et al., 2011b). In particular, leverage is 
negatively and significantly related to corporate investment, which is consistent with the debt 
overhang/debt pre-commitment problems (Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990). The positive 
coefficient on Tobin’s Q suggests that corporate investment depends largely on firm 
investment opportunities. We also observe that firms’ free cash flow and gross profits are 
both positively related to investment, indicating that more availability of cash encourages 
firms’ investment activities. Furthermore, both firm total assets and tangible assets are 
significantly associated with investment expenditures, indicating that larger-sized firms invest 
more.   
4.3 Political connections, ultimate owner type and investment efficiency 
In this section, we examine the change in investment efficiency, to further complete our 
investigation. In particular, we estimate equation (2) and report the results in Table 6. 
Our estimations for the full sample are in column 1, and for both SOE and non-SOE 
samples in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The estimated coefficients on Corrupt, Post and 
Corrupt*Post are generally similar to those reported in Table 5. Across three specifications, 
we are more concerned about the interaction terms of Q with Corrupt and/or Post. For the 
full sample in column 1, we observe that the estimated coefficient on Corrupt*Q is positive, 
indicating that, on average, event firms usually have higher investment efficiency relative to 
non-event firms, although the difference is insignificant. Both Post*Q and Corrupt*Post*Q 
show insignificant coefficients.  
More interestingly, SOEs and non-SOEs show substantial differences with respect to 
investment efficiencies. In particular, in column 2 for SOEs, we find that estimated 
coefficients of Post*Q and Corrupt*Post*Q are both positive and statistically significant at 
10% and 5% levels, respectively (t-values are 1.68 and 2.39, respectively), indicating that 
investment efficiency has improved after the termination of political connections, which is 
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more pronounced for event SOEs relative to non-event SOEs. In column 3 for non-SOEs, we 
observe that the coefficients of both Post*Q and Corrupt*Post*Q are negative and 
statistically significant (t-values are -1.82 and -3.05, respectively), indicating that, after the 
termination of political connections, investment efficiency has declined for non-SOEs, which 
is more pronounced for event non-SOEs relative to non-event non-SOEs. Due to the potential 
issue of measurement error in Tobin’s Q, we apply the IV approach for estimation, and use 
the lagged mismeasured variables as the instruments, following Erickson and Whited (2012). 
In all specifications, we also conduct the over-identification tests to examine whether the 
instrument variables are valid. The unreported p-values of the over-identification tests are all 
larger than 0.1, indicating that the instruments we used are valid. As with Table 5, we also 
conduct the Chow test, and the results (F=6.49, p<0.01) confirm a significant difference in 
the influence of the termination of political connections on investment efficiency between 
SOEs and non-SOEs.  
These results support our hypothesis H2, that after the ousting of corrupt officers, 
investment efficiency improves for event SOEs compared with non-event SOEs, while it 
declines for event non-SOEs compared with non-event non-SOEs. These results suggest that 
rent seeking with bribery is detrimental in SOEs (sanding the wheel), so that investment 
efficiency recovers after the corruption events, while it is beneficial for non-SOEs (greasing 
the wheel). Our results also corroborate the findings of existing studies (Chen et al., 2011b; 
Zheng and Zhu, 2013). 
Table 6 
The effect of political connections on corporate investment efficiency 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
efficiency. Quarterly observations for the event firms and control firms from three years before to three years 
after the event of corruption are applied in the regressions. The dependent variable is corporate investment 
expenditure. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms bribing government officers or connected with 
the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for observations of the 
post-event period, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in 
parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is the investment expenditure 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt 0.07(0.70) 0.02(0.19) 0.17*(1.91) 
Post -0.16**(-2.10) -0.01**(-2.02) -0.34***(-3.05) 
Corrupt*Post -0.04(-0.36) -0.03(-1.14) -0.17**(-2.24) 
Corrupt*Q 0.02(0.61) -0.01(-0.28) 0.04(0.93) 
Post*Q 0.04(1.45) 0.03*(1.68) -0.10*(-1.82) 
Corrupt*Post*Q 0.03(0.06) 0.05**(2.39) -0.05***(-3.05) 
Q 0.05**(2.19) 0.02***(2.58) 0.07*(1.89) 
Leverage -0.11**(-2.09) -0.19***(-2.57) -0.12**(-1.98) 
Cashflow 0.74*(1.91) 1.21***(5.59) 0.55(1.05) 
Size 0.02(1.08) 0.02*(1.75) 0.01(0.42) 
Sale 0.24***(3.03) 0.25***(4.70) 0.24**(2.05) 
Tangibility 0.19***(5.32) 0.08*(1.74) 0.19***(4.64) 
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Constant 0.10(0.37) -0.15(-0.57) 0.23(0.36) 
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Chow test  6.49***  
Adjusted R square 0.48 0.25 0.53 
Over identification test 0.48 0.50 0.33 
Observations 4522 2128 2394 
 
4.4 Bribing firms vs. connected firms 
Our foregoing results are derived based on a sample that includes both bribing firms and 
connected firms, and their matching firms. However, bribing firms and connected firms are 
connected with governments in different ways, so that their respective political connections 
may demonstrate different effects on firm investment decisions. Specifically, compared with 
connected firms, bribing firms are more likely to devote firm resources to the building of 
political connections in order to seek rents from government. Then, according to our 
theoretical argument in developing hypotheses, managers of SOE bribing firms can extract 
more private benefits due to a lack of monitoring, and these firms are less likely to invest for 
the creation of economic value and will thus have less efficient investment. However, in non-
SOEs, bribery brings more favourable treatment and investment opportunities to the firms, 
and this outweighs the cost of the bribery, so that non-SOEs invest more efficiently to create 
value-adding for the firms, as their objective is value maximization. Thus, SOE (non-SOE) 
bribing firms may experience a larger improvement (reduction) in their investment efficiency 
after the termination of political connections, relative to SOE (non-SOE) connected firms. 
Thus, it is necessary and valuable to distinguish bribing firms from connected firms, and to 
investigate the differential effects of political connections.  
To address this issue and test our expectations, we re-estimate both equations (1) and (2) 
using the event firm sample. In particular, we replace Corrupt with Bribe, which is a dummy 
variable and equals 1 for bribing firms, and 0 for connected firms. We also conduct the same 
estimations for both the SOE and non-SOE samples, and the results are reported in Table 7. 
In Panel A, the coefficients of Bribe*Post are our main concern; and they are significantly 
negative for the SOE sample and insignificant for the non-SOE sample. These results indicate 
that in SOEs, compared with connected firms, bribing firms experience a larger decline in 
investment expenditures after the termination of political connections, but this difference is 
insignificant in non-SOEs. In Panel B, our concern is the coefficients of Bribe*Post*Q. We 
find that this coefficient is significantly positive for the SOE sample and negative for non-
SOE sample. These results suggest that, compared with connected firms, bribing firms 
improve their investment efficiency more in SOEs, while they deteriorate more in non-SOEs. 
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Overall, this test confirms our expectation that different types of political connections 




The effect of political connections on investment expenditures and efficiency for the event firm sample 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
decisions for the event firm sample. Quarterly observations for the event firms from three years before to three 
years after the event of corruption are applied in the regressions. The dependent variables are corporate 
investment expenditure in Panels A and B. Bribe is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for bribing firms, and 0 for 
connected firms. All the other variables are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using 
the robust standard error clustered by the firm. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively.     
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Panel A: Investment expenditure regression 
Bribe 0.01(0.86) 0.03**(2.34) -0.02(-1.19) 
Post -0.01**(-1.96) -0.01**(-2.49) -0.01*(-1.86) 
Bribe*Post 0.01(0.26) -0.02*(-1.67) 0.02(1.22) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, free cash flow, and industry and 
quarter fixed effects 
Adjusted R square 0.36 0.22 0.39 
Observations 2261 1064 1197 
Panel B: Investment efficiency regression 
Bribe 0.11(0.91) 0.03(0.55) 0.46(0.45) 
Bribe*Q 0.03(0.61) -0.09(-1.28) 0.13**(2.08) 
Bribe*Post*Q 0.07*(1.79) 0.09*(1.80) -0.02**(-2.30) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, free cash flow, and industry and 
quarter fixed effects. Other interaction terms between each pair of our interest variables are also included in 
each regression 
Chow test  6.55**  
Adjusted R square 0.41 0.32 0.44 
Over identification test 0.68 0.70 0.55 
Observations 2261 1064 1197 
 
4.5 Alternative explanation and robustness tests 
We interpret our findings by referring to the termination of political connections. 
Nevertheless, there is an alternative explanation concerning firms’ reputation. If the ousting 
of the corrupt officials was publicly released, it is a natural expectation that the reputation of 
event firms will be damaged, which in turn will affect their investment decisions. To rule out 
this alternative explanation, we compare the investment decisions in the third year before the 
public release of corruption cases. Empirically, we repeat previous regressions by limiting 
our sample to observations in that year, and report the results in Table 8. This cross-sectional 
comparison allows us to examine whether close connections with governments may boost 
firms’ investment, and influence investment efficiency, differently in SOEs and non-SOEs. 
As shown in Panel A, we find that the estimated coefficients of Corrupt are all positive and 
significant for non-SOEs. The results from Panel B show that estimated coefficients of 
Corrupt*Q are positive for non-SOEs and negative for SOEs. Overall, these results suggest 
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that well before the influence of the corruption scandals was felt, the event firms had more 
investment expenditures than non-event firms, and that this difference is more significant in 
non-SOEs. These results also show that compared with their non-event counterparts, event 
SOEs exhibit less efficient investment, while event non-SOEs have more efficient investment. 
Hence, the change in investment decisions following the corruption event is unlikely to be 
driven by the public concern about reputation.  
Table 8. 
The effect of political connections on investment expenditures and efficiency before the ousting of corrupt 
official (observations of the third year before the corruption cases) 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
decisions before the ousting of corrupt officials. Observations for the event firms and control firms in the third 
year before the corruption events are applied in the regressions. The dependent variables are corporate 
investment expenditure in Panels A and B. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms bribing 
government officers or connected with the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables 
are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by 
the firm. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.     
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Panel A: Investment expenditure regression 
Corrupt 0.02*(1.71) 0.04(0.90) 0.01*(1.74) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
and industry fixed effects 
Chow test  2.87*  
Adjusted R square 0.29 0.19 0.30 
Observations 671 329 342 
Panel B: Investment efficiency regression 
Corrupt 0.05(0.32) 0.04(0.30) 0.07(0.22) 
Corrupt*Q -0.03(-0.61) -0.05*(-1.76) 0.03**(2.40) 
Q 0.08**(1.96) 0.04*(1.90) 0.13**(1.98) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow and 
industry fixed effects 
Chow test  4.33**  
Adjusted R square 0.57 0.17 0.62 
Over identification test 0.22 0.30 0.27 
Observations 671 329 342 
 
In the prior analysis, we measure political connections through bribing activities and 
personal relationships. However, a parallel strand of literature argues that firms’ location also 
forms a powerful basis for political connections or proximity to political power (Faccio and 
Parsley, 2009; Kim et al. 2012). In view of this, our results may be driven by this alternative 
explanation, as some event firms in our sample are located in the same jurisdiction as corrupt 
politicians, and these firms are already favoured by politicians in spite of bribing activities or 
personal relationships. To rule out this alternative explanation, we repeat the previous 
analysis by partitioning our full sample into two subsamples based on whether firms are 
located in the same jurisdiction as corrupt politicians. For the sake of brevity, we do not 
report the results in the paper. The unreported results show that our main results still hold in 
both subsamples, which validates our hypothesis.  
23 
 
In addition, it could also be argued that, if both SOEs and non-SOEs are connected to the 
same corrupt bureaucrat, customers may switch from non-SOEs to SOEs because they 
believe that non-SOEs will deteriorate their productivity due to the loss of political 
connections. If this is the case, these connected SOEs could be better off, due to the shock of 
positive demand, and improve their investment efficiency
5
. To rule out this possibility, we 
repeat our previous regression analysis by including the corrupt bureaucrats that are 
connected to only one non-SOE or SOE. To save space, we do not report the results in the 
paper, but they are available on request. The unreported results are similar to those reported 
in both Tables 5 and 6, confirming that the differential trends between SOEs and non-SOEs 
still hold for the alternative samples, and that changes in firms’ investment decisions are 
mainly influenced by the termination of political connections.  
We also conduct a series of other robustness tests. Firstly, in previous analyses, we 
constructed the control sample based on firm total assets by using the matching method. Now, 
we conduct the propensity score matching (PSM) method to reconstruct our control sample. 
In particular, the candidate firms for the matching process are from the same industry and the 
same year, with the same type of ultimate owner. Then, we select the optimal match based on 
the closest propensity score of being politically connected. To calculate the propensity score, 
we include a set of firm characteristics that can capture the probability of being event firms, 
namely firm size, leverage, the largest shareholder ownership and state ownership, following 
existing studies (Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2012)
6
. Secondly, instead of conducting 
regression estimations for the SOE and non-SOEs samples separately, we conduct regression 
estimation using the full sample and include an SOE dummy and its interaction terms with 
our key variables. Specifically, the SOE dummy equals 1 for SOEs, and 0 for non-SOEs. The 
results of the above tests are reported in Table 9. To save space, we only report the key 
variables from the investment expenditure equation, while full results are available on request. 
These results are similar to those reported in previous tables, and are consistent with our main 
hypotheses that the termination of political connections affect firms’ investment decisions.      
Table 9 
The effect of political connections on corporate investment expenditures (robustness tests) 
This table presents the regression results of the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
expenditures. The dependent variable is corporate investment expenditure. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal 
                                                          
5
 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue.  
6
 Following this PSM, we are able to collect 4720 firm-quarter observations. This sample size is slightly 
different from the 4522 based on the total assets matching. This is because we identify control firms with the 
treatment firms at the time of the quarter in which the corruption event occurs. Thus, using different matching 
methods, we construct a control sample including different firms, and these different sets of control firms may 
have different data available from three years before to three years after the corruption events. 
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to 1 for firms bribing government officers or connected with corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. Post 
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for observations of post-event period, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables 
are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by 
the firm. * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is corporate investment expenditures 
 PSM matching sample Full sample with SOE dummy 
Corrupt 0.04(0.53) 0.01*(1.81) 
Post -0.08*(-1.92) -0.02***(-4.33) 
Corrupt*Post -0.05***(-2.62) -0.03***(-2.94) 
Corrupt*Post*SOE  0.02***(3.44) 
Corrupt*SOE  0.01*(1.89) 
Post*SOE  0.01***(2.91) 
SOE  -0.02***(-4.00) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s 
Q, and industry fixed effects 
Adjusted R square 0.47 0.47 
Observations 4720 4522 
 
In the investment efficiency regression, we noted the measurement error when we used 
Tobin’s Q as the proxy for investment opportunities; we now conduct two alternative 
specifications to check the robustness of our main results. Firstly, we follow the method used 
by Bushman et al. (2011) and Zheng and Zhu (2013), and use the sensitivity of investment 
growth to the change in investment opportunities (marginal Q) to measure investment 
efficiency. In particular, marginal Q is measured by the log of one plus lagged industry stock 
returns. Using industry stock returns can allow us to eliminate the influence of time-invariant 
variables at the firm level, and industry stock returns are less likely to be determined by firm-
specific factors. Secondly, we use the high-order moment estimator, proposed by Robert and 
Whited (2012), to remedy the measurement error. We report the results estimated based on 
the information contained in the fifth-order moments, in Table 10. To save space, we only 
report the results for key variables. 
Table 10. 
The effect of political connections on investment efficiency (robustness tests) 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on corporate investment 
efficiency. Quarterly observations for the event firms from three years before to three years after the event of 
corruption are applied in the regressions. The dependent variables are corporate investment growth in Panel A 
and investment expenditure in Panel B. RET is measured as the log of one plus lagged industry stock returns. 
All the other variables are defined as in Table 2. In Panel A, T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the 
robust standard error clustered by the firm. In Panel B, Z-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.     
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Panel A: Bushman et al. (2011) industry stock return method 
Corrupt*RET 0.25(1.09) 0.39(1.38) 0.19(0.55) 
Post*RET 0.25(1.19) 0.34**(2.40) -0.19*(-1.84) 
Corrupt*Post*RET 0.04(1.48) 0.07**(2.00) -0.03***(-2.58) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, and 
quarter and industry fixed effects 
Adjusted R square 0.47 0.24 0.52 
Observations 4522 2128 2394 
Panel B: Robert and Whited (2012) High-order moment estimator 
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Corrupt*Q 0.03*(1.71) -0.02(-1.01) 0.08***(2.74) 
Post*Q 0.03(1.49) 0.04*(1.79) -0.02*(-1.77) 
Corrupt*Post*Q 0.04(1.30) 0.12**(4.60) -0.01***(-2.60) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow and quarter 
and industry fixed effects. Other interaction terms between each pair of our interest variables are also included 
in each regression. 
Rho square 0.45 0.22 0.49 
Observations 4522 2128 2394 
 
4.6 Influence of the recent anti-corruption campaign 
We have proved that event firms experience significant changes in investment decisions 
(both investment expenditures and investment efficiency) relative to non-event firms. Our 
focus now will be the difference in the change in corporate investment decisions for event 
firms before and after the recent anti-corruption campaign that began after the conclusion of 
the 18
th
 Congress Conference at the end of 2012. Empirically, we re-estimate our previous 
regressions for the event firm sample only by replacing the variable Corrupt with Campaign, 
which is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 for the post anti-corruption period, and 0 
before, and report the results in Table 11. An interaction term between Post and Campaign is 
also included to test H3, the difference in investment decision changes before and after the 
anti-corruption campaign.  
Panel A presents the results of the investment expenditure regression. Consistent with 
our results reported in Table 5, we observe that the average investment expenditure decreases 
after the corruption events, reflected by the statistically negative coefficients on Post across 
three specifications. Our concern is the coefficients on the interaction terms, which are 
negative across all specifications and statistically significant for the full sample and non-
SOEs. This indicates that, after the ousting of corrupt officers, event firms experience a 
significant decline in investment expenditures compared with non-event firms, which was 
especially so after the anti-corruption campaign, and that this phenomenon is more 
pronounced for non-SOEs, which is consistent with our hypothesis H3. Panel B presents the 
results of the investment efficiency regression. As can be seen from columns 2 and 3 for both 
SOE and non-SOE subsamples, the estimated coefficients of Campaign*Post*Q are positive 
for SOEs and negative for non-SOEs (t-values are 2.13 and -1.78, respectively). This is 
consistent with our broad expectation that the influence of the recent anti-corruption 
campaign has been more effective in bringing back overall investment efficiency in SOEs, 
while decreasing investment efficiency in non-SOEs. The signs of these two coefficients for 
both SOEs and non-SOEs are also consistent with those reported in Table 6, confirming the 
roles of sanding and greasing the wheel that corruption has played in SOEs and non-SOEs, 
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respectively. These results are consistent with our predictions that the boldest and most 
serious anti-corruption campaign has imposed a more effective influence on firms’ 
investment decisions.    
Table 11 
The effect of political connections on corporate investment decisions around the anti-corruption campaign for 
the event firm sample  
This table presents the regression results for comparing the influence of political connections on corporate 
investment decisions before and after the anti-corruption campaign. Quarterly observations for the event firms 
from three years before to three years after the event of corruption are applied in the regressions. Campaign is a 
dummy variable, equal to 1 for observations after the anti-corruption campaign, and 0 otherwise. All the other 
variables are defined as in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error 
clustered by the firm. *, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Panel A: Investment expenditure regression 
Campaign -0.06***(-2.79) -0.03(-1.42) -0.08**(-2.14) 
Campaign*Post -0.07***(-2.71) -0.03(-1.40) -0.10**(-2.17) 
Post -0.06***(-3.43) -0.06***(-3.05) -0.06**(-2.44) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
and industry and quarter fixed effects 
Chow test  2.85*  
Adjusted R square 0.37 0.23 0.43 
Observations 2261 1064 1197 
Panel B: Investment efficiency regression 
Campaign -0.07*(-1.88) -0.07(-1.27) -0.03**(-2.03) 
Campaign*Q -0.05(-1.39) 0.07(1.41) -0.08(-1.56) 
Campaign*Post*Q 0.05(1.25) 0.04**(2.13) -0.05*(-1.78) 
Q 0.01**(2.04) 0.02**(2.44) 0.07**(2.16) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow and 
industry and quarter fixed effects. Other interaction terms between each pair of our interest variables are also 
included in each regression 
Chow test  7.37***  
Adjusted R square 0.41 0.26 0.44 
Over identification test 0.44 0.48 0.34 
Observations 2261 1064 1197 
 
In addition to the previous tests, we also conduct some analyses to provide additional 
evidence to support our main hypotheses. Firstly, our main results suggest that political 
connections formed through corruption affect firms’ investment decisions, so it is natural to 
expect that the influence of political connections is more pronounced in regions where 
corruption is more severe. Moreover, as argued before, the termination of political 
connections can mitigate the agency problems in SOEs and thus are beneficial for SOEs, but 
remove the benefits for non-SOEs, so we provide further evidence to support our arguments. 
Empirically, we examine whether, after the ousting of politicians, firm performance improves 
in event SOEs while it decreases in event non-SOEs, and whether stock market response is 
positive for event SOEs and negative for event non-SOEs. We also use both perquisites and 
CEO pay-performance relationship as proxies for the agency problem, and examine the 
changes in these two proxies after the ousting of politicians. 
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The overall results of these tests show that the influence of political connection 
terminations on firm investment decisions is more pronounced in regions where corruption is 
more severe. They also show that, after the ousting of politicians, the event SOEs (non-SOEs) 
experience an improved (decreased) firm performance and positive (negative) stock market 
reactions. Moreover, perquisites decrease and pay-performance relationship becomes stronger 
for event SOEs, while event non-SOEs do not exhibit such significant change. These results 
further support our arguments and the main hypotheses. The detailed discussions and 
empirical results of these tests are presented in Appendix A.   
5. Conclusion 
Political capital and its economic implications have attracted much attention worldwide. 
In this study, we take advantage of corruption scandals in China to examine how political 
capital established through corruption shapes corporate investment decisions. In a departure 
from most existing cross-sectional studies, our study uses a natural experiment to avoid the 
endogeneity issue and clearly identify the causal effect of political capital on firm investment 
behaviours. Our sample includes all listed firms connected with high-level corrupt 
government bureaucrats through bribery or personal relationships, and their matching firms.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that investment expenditures decrease 
significantly, and that this is more pronounced for event non-SOEs following the arrest of the 
corrupt bureaucrats. We also find that investment efficiency is increased for event SOEs and 
reduced for event non-SOEs, relative to their non-event counterparties. We also observe that 
the above-mentioned change in investment decisions becomes more pronounced, for bribing 
firms, after the recent anti-corruption campaign or in more corrupt regions. Our additional 
analysis confirms the role played by the termination of political connections. In particular, we 
find that firm performance has recovered for event SOEs and deteriorated for event non-
SOEs. Consistently, investors respond positively towards corruption cases for event SOEs, 
while negatively for event non-SOEs. We also document that perks are reduced significantly, 
and the executive pay-performance relationship becomes stronger, following the ousting of 
corrupt officials, and that the magnitude of these changes has been amplified after the 
initiation of the recent anti-corruption campaign, which applies particularly to SOEs.    
Overall, our results reveal that political capital obtained through corruption may ‘sand 
the wheel’ of growth in SOEs, due to the fact that corruption may create potential collusion 
between SOE managers and government officers to extract private benefits for both of them; 
and that the recent anti-corruption campaign has effectively constrained the self-dealing 
behaviours of SOE managers, reflected by an improvement in investment efficiency and firm 
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performance. However, corruption can be beneficial for non-SOEs, being used as the ‘grease 
money’ in exchange for government protection and good government service. Therefore, the 
recent anti-corruption campaign has broken this pattern and deteriorated investment 
efficiency, as well as performance, for non-SOEs.  
Therefore, we argue that the success of the anti-corruption depends largely on the 
improvement of the legal and institutional environments. Our study has some useful 
implications for policy makers. On the one hand, it is desirable that a stronger institutional 
and legal system be established to shape SOE manager behaviours effectively. On the other 
hand, government might be encouraged to relinquish its control over the creation and 
allocation of economic rents, which will eliminate the ideological discrimination against non-
SOEs. These will interactively reduce or even eliminate the incentives for both SOEs and 







A1. Influence of political connections on investment decisions across regions 
In this section, we examine the influence of cross-sectional variations of corruption on 
investment decisions, by exploring firms’ geographic locations. As our main finding from the 
previous analysis is that corruption distorts firms’ investment decisions, it is natural to expect 
that this phenomenon is more pronounced in regions where corruption is more severe. To test 
our conjecture, we first construct a regional corruption index
7
, and divide all regions into two 
groups, in which the regional corruption index is above and below the median level of the 
corruption index for a given year. Then, we divide our sample firms into two groups located 
in more and less corrupt regions, and re-estimate investment expenditures and efficiency 
regressions for each subsample.  
Table A1 reports the estimation results of our key variables. Panels A and B report both 
investment expenditures and investment efficiency regressions, respectively. In Panel A, the 
coefficient of Corrupt*Post is negative and statistically significant for the more corrupt 
region sample, while it is insignificant for the less corrupt region sample; indicating that 
event firms in more corrupt regions experience a significant decline in investment 
expenditures after the termination of political connections. In Panel B, the interaction term 
Corrupt*Post*Q shows a positive and significant coefficient for the more corrupt region 
sample only, indicating that event firms in more corrupt regions experience a significant 
improvement in investment efficiency after the termination of political connections. These 
results are broadly consistent with our expectations that corruption shows a more significant 
influence on firms’ investment decisions if firms are located in regions where corruption is 
more severe. 
Table A1 
The effect of political connections on corporate investment decisions in more and less corrupt regions  
This table presents the regression results for comparing the influence of political connections on corporate 
investment decisions between more and less corrupt regions. Quarterly observations from three years before to 
three years after the event of corruption are applied in the regressions. All the variables are defined as in Table 2. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 More corruption regions Less corruption regions 
Panel A: Investment expenditure regression 
Corrupt 0.05*(1.64) 0.05(0.52) 
Post -0.14***(-4.96) -0.12**(-2.26) 
Corrupt*Post -0.11***(-2.92) -0.10(-1.00) 
                                                          
7
 To construct a regional corruption index, we collect the following information for each province in each year 
during our sample from the China Procuratorial Yearbook: (1) the number of duty crime cases, (2) the number 
of government officials involved in these cases, and (3) the total number of government officials. Then, we 
calculate the corruption index as the ratio of (2) to (3) for each province in each year, which measures the 
number of government officials that are arrested per capita.  
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Control variables from investment expenditures are also included in each regression 
Chow test 4.45**  
Adjusted R square 0.42 0.46 
Observations 2261 2261 
Panel B: Investment efficiency regression 
Corrupt*Q 0.02(0.22) -0.01(-0.35) 
Post*Q -0.08*(-1.82) 0.08(0.98) 
Corrupt*Post*Q 0.13***(2.58) -0.01(-1.41) 
Corrupt, Post and their interaction term, as well as other control variables from investment efficiency are also 
included in each regression 
Chow test 4.23**  
Adjusted R square 0.43 0.51 
Over identification test 0.33 0.38 
Observations 2261 2261 
 
A2. Political connections and firm performance 
Firms’ investment decisions can significantly influence firm performance, because firm 
performance responds positively to better investment, and gains from investment enhance 
firm profitability (Chen et al., 2009). To complement our main argument, in this section we 
examine whether changes in investment decisions are associated with changes in firm 
performance. We use the pre-event performance as a benchmark to evaluate firms’ post-event 
performance and the changes in firm performance before and after the corruption events. 
Empirically, we apply the return on assets (ROA) as the proxy for performance, and we 
regress ROA against variables of our interest and a set of control variables, and report the 
results in Table A2. 
As can be seen, the estimated coefficient on Corrupt is negative and significant at the 5% 
level for the full sample and SOE sample, indicating that corruption incurs potential costs that 
will reduce firm performance. In relation to the Post, we find that they are negatively related 
to firm performance, suggesting that average firm performance declines after the corruption 
events. The interaction term is our main concern. In particular, for the full sample in column 
1, we find that the interaction term is positive, indicating that the average decline in firm 
performance is lower for event firms relative to non-event firms. When we split our total 
sample into both SOEs and non-SOEs, we find some further supportive evidence. For the 
SOE sample, the average firm performance increases (-0.02+0.07=0.05) for event firms 
relative to non-event firms after the ousting of corrupt officers, indicating that corruption 
reduces firm performance for SOEs. For the non-SOE sample, the interaction term 
Corrupt*Post shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient (t-value is -2.35), 
indicating that, after the corruption events, the performance of non-SOE event firms 
experiences a more significant decline, relative to non-event non-SOEs. The overall results 
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are consistent with our main argument, and provide supportive evidence for the hypothesis 
H2 that corruption sands the wheel in SOEs and greases the wheel in non-SOEs.    
Table A2 
The effect of political connections on firm performance 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on firm performance. 
Quarterly observations for the event firms and control firms from three years before to three years after the 
event of corruption are applied in the regressions. The dependent variable is return on assets, defined as the ratio 
of net income to total assets. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms bribing government officers or 
connected with the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for 
observations of post-event period, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined as in previous tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt -0.05**(-2.03) -0.05**(-2.18) 0.02(0.62) 
Post -0.03*(-1.75) -0.02*(-1.94) -0.05(-1.47) 
Corrupt*Post 0.06(0.44) 0.07*(1.85) -0.02**(-2.35) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
and industry and quarter fixed effects 
Chow test  3.90**  
Adjusted R square 0.26 0.26 0.28 
Observations 4522 2128 2394 
 
A3. Political connections and cumulative abnormal returns 
In this section, we examine how investors react to the announcements of corruption 
events for event firms and non-event firms. This examination adds additional evidence to 
identify the effect of political connections in both SOEs and non-SOEs. In particular, the 
announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the corruption event announcements, using the market-adjusted excess return model. 
We choose a three-day event window (i.e. -1, +1), and 230 days as the estimation window (i.e. 
-240, -10). The event day is defined as the first day when the corruption scandal was 
identified and announced to the public. For the regression analysis, we regress CARs against 
our key variables and control variables. Consistent with the method used by Claessens et al. 
(2008), the values of firm-level control variables are the average over our sample period.  
As shown in Table A3, the coefficients on Corrupt are significantly negative for the full 
sample (column 1), indicating that, once corrupt officers have stepped down, the market 
value of connected firms is negatively affected. The estimated coefficient on Corrupt for non-
SOEs is also negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -5.63), which is 
consistent with our expectation. However, some interesting results appear when we turn to 
the SOE samples. In particular, the coefficient on Corrupt is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.16), indicating that investors feel optimistic about the 
termination of political capital in SOEs. Although the general results are somewhat surprising, 
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at least for SOEs, they are broadly consistent with our predictions that political capital 
obtained from corruption is detrimental for SOEs, but beneficial for non-SOEs. 
Table A3 
The effect of political connections on market reactions (CARs) 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on CARs. The dependent 
variable is the three-day CARs around corruption event announcements. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 
1 for firms bribing government officers or connected with the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. All 
the other variables are defined as in previous tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is the CARs (-1, +1) around corruption event announcements 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt -0.10**(-2.49) 0.03**(2.16) -0.22***(-5.63) 
Control variables in each regression include return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, leverage, sales level, 
free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, industry fixed effects 
Chow test  7.03***  
Adjusted R square 0.09 0.07 0.14 
Observations 220 104 116 
 
It is possible that event firms may anticipate a decline in their market value due to the 
announcement of the corruption case, so that they may reinforce their political connections 
well before these announcements. Thus, our regression results may not really capture the 
effect of the termination of political connections. According to our previous discussion, that 
changes in political connection status may affect firm investment decisions, we expect to 
observe a significant difference in CARs between firms with and without political 
connections before those connections are terminated. To rule out this possibility, we conduct 
a placebo test by examining the CARs for the date immediately before the corruption case 
announcements. In particular, we redefine the event date as two days before the 
announcements of corruption events, and repeat our regression analysis in Table A3
8
. The 
unreported results show that, for the full sample, SOE and non-SOE samples, the CARs of 
firms with political connections do not differ significantly from those of firms without 
political connections; and these results confirm our previous discussion.   
A4. Political connections and perks 
We have argued that, in SOEs, the incentives for pursuing private benefits motivate 
potential collusion between corrupt government officials and SOE managers, which will 
ultimately reduce investment efficiency. Furthermore, the private benefits extracted by SOE 
managers are likely to be in the form of perks (Gul et al., 2011), as their compensations are 
capped according to government policy (Hu et al., 2013). Consistent with our previous results, 
we conjecture that the amount of perks obtained by SOE managers will decline significantly 
                                                          
8
 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue and suggesting this test. 
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following the ousting of corrupt officials. In this section, we attempt to provide some direct 
evidence to verify our argument.  
We follow Gul et al. (2011) to construct the amount of perks obtained. The perk data in 
this study is hand-collected from a particular item recorded in the notes of statements in firms’ 
annual reports, called ‘Other Cash Payments for the Expenses Related to Operating 
Activities’. Under this section, firms voluntarily disclose perk data from which six expense 
items are identified as constituting perks, namely travelling expenses, business entertainment 
expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting expenses, company car expenses, and 
meeting expenses. Then, our perk variable is the sum of these six items scaled by firm sales. 
Due to the limitation of data availability, only annual perks are collected for empirical 
analysis.  
Table A4 shows the regression results. In column 1 for the full sample, we observe that 
the estimated coefficient of Post is negative and statistically significant (t-value is -3.98), 
indicating that the amount of perks consumed has declined significantly after the corruption 
scandals. When we turn to both the SOE and non-SOE samples, we find that this negative 
coefficient is still significant for SOEs, while it has become insignificant for non-SOEs, 
which is consistent with our conjecture. We then observe that the estimated coefficient of 
Corrupt*Post is negative and statistically significant for SOEs (coefficient is -1.60 and t-
value is -2.15), indicating that potential private benefits obtained by managers decreased 
significantly after the ousting of corrupt officials, and that the anti-corruption campaign is 
effective in curbing SOE managers’ self-dealing behaviour. Overall, these results provide 
some direct evidence that, in SOEs, perks are actually the form of private benefits extracted 
by SOE managers, which motivates SOEs to boost investment activities with low efficiency. 
Once the ousting of corrupt officials occurs, investment efficiency will be rectified, due to 
constraints on the self-dealing behaviour of SOE managers and the amount of perks available. 
In non-SOEs, on the other hand, there is no significant change in perks, as managerial self-
dealing behaviour is monitored by controlling shareholders, and thus the benefits obtained 
through political connections matter more for investment efficiency, as well as firm 
performance.     
Table A4 
The effect of political connections on perks 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on perks. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of perks to sales. Corrupt is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms bribing government 
officers or connected with the corrupt government officers, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, equal to 
1 for observations of post-event period, and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined as in previous tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Dependent variable is the ratio of perks to sales level 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt 0.63(1.00) 2.14(1.16) 0.14(0.18) 
Post -2.65***(-3.98) -3.42***(-3.41) -2.27(-1.53) 
Corrupt*Post -1.04(-1.12) -1.60**(-2.15) 1.25(1.02) 
Control variables in each regression include return on assets, firm size, tangible assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, 
industry and year fixed effects 
Chow test  3.05*  
Adjusted R square 0.11 0.10 0.18 
Observations 1046 545 501 
 
A5. Political connections and the pay-performance relationship 
As we have previously argued, the political connections established through bribery or 
personal relationships will exacerbate agency problems in SOEs, which will result in less 
efficient investment activities. In this section, we try to provide additional empirical evidence 
to show that the agency problem is mitigated once the political connections in SOEs are 
terminated. We focus on the relationship between managerial compensation and firm 
performance, as the proxy for the severity of the agency problem, because severe agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders result from inadequate monitoring by 
shareholders, so that managers’ compensation may be less likely to be closely linked to firm 
performance. Empirically, we regress the average compensation of the three most highly paid 
executives against firm performance and a set of control variables consistent with prior 
studies (Firth et al., 2006).   
Table A5 reports the regression results, and our main focus is the interaction terms of 
ROA with other variables. In column 1, the estimated coefficient on Corrupt*Post*ROA is 
positive, indicating that the managerial pay-performance relationship becomes stronger 
following the corruption scandals, although the result is insignificant. Moreover, we find that 
this result becomes significant for SOEs (column 2), suggesting that, once the political 
connections between SOE managers and bureaucrats terminate, the SOE managers may face 
more monitoring by government officials, and the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders become weaker, which will enhance the link between managerial compensation 
and firm performance. In relation to ROA, we find that the estimated coefficients are positive 
and significant, which is consistent with previous studies (Firth et al., 2006). As for non-
SOEs, we find no evidence that the pay-performance relationship has changed significantly 
since the termination of political connections. The proposed explanation for this insignificant 
change is that termination of political connections may only mitigate the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders; and, as the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders is more important in non-SOEs, the disciplinary 
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power of controlling shareholders may not necessarily change, so that the influence of 
political connections is insignificant. 
Table A5 
The effect of political connections on the managerial pay-performance relationship 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of political connections on the managerial pay-
performance relationship. The dependent variable is average compensation of top three paid executives. Corrupt 
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for firms bribing government officers or connected with the corrupt government 
officers, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for observations of post-event period, and 0 
otherwise. All the other variables are defined as in previous tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is the log of average compensation of top three executives 
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Corrupt -0.65(-1.02) -1.91*(-1.85) 0.28(0.33) 
Post -2.50***(-3.75) -2.89***(-2.68) -2.18**(-2.39) 
Corrupt*Post 1.07(1.16) 1.54(1.08) 1.01(0.81) 
Corrupt*ROA 0.97(0.43) 0.45(0.05) -0.93(-0.32) 
Post*ROA 1.18(1.04) 3.37(0.37) 1.39(0.42) 
Corrupt*Post*ROA 2.41(0.85) 3.44**(2.37) 2.33(0.53) 
ROA 0.15**(2.16) 5.03***(2.57) 0.06**(2.42) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, tangible assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, board size, 
proportion of independent directors, industry and year fixed effects 
Chow test  4.08**  
Adjusted R square 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Observations 1046 545 501 
 
A6. Additional evidence from the recent anti-corruption campaign 
In Section 4.6, we documented that changes in investment and investment efficiency 
after the ousting of corrupt officials are more significant since the initiation of the recent anti-
corruption campaign in China. In the previous analyses in this Appendix, we have also 
provided additional evidence that the ousting of corrupt officials also results in a significant 
change in firm performance, perks and the pay-performance relationship; and we are thus 
more interested in examining whether these changes are more pronounced during the recent 
anti-corruption campaign period. In this subsection, we conduct a similar investigation to that 
in Table 11, to examine the difference before and after the initiation of the anti-corruption 
campaign, by focusing on the event firm sample.  
Table A6 shows the regression results, and each panel represents each dependent 
variable of our interest, the main concern being the interaction term of Campaign with other 
variables in SOEs and non-SOEs. In Panel A, we find that the estimated coefficient of 
Campaign*Post is significantly positive for SOEs (column 2) and significantly negative for 
non-SOEs (column 3). These results suggest that firm performance increases for SOEs and 
decreases for non-SOEs after the corruption cases, and that the magnitude of these changes is 
amplified since the initiation of the anti-corruption campaign. The results in Panel B indicate 
that, for the post-anticorruption period, investors feel more optimistic towards the termination 
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of political connections in SOEs, while more pessimistic in non-SOEs. Panel C and Panel D 
deal with changes in the entrenched agency problem. In particular, Panel C shows that the 
amount of perks consumed by managers has been reduced more in SOEs since the initiation 
of the anti-corruption campaign (reflected by the significantly negative coefficient of 
Campaign*Post in column 2), and Panel D indicates that the pay-performance relationship in 
SOEs becomes stronger for the post-anticorruption period (reflected by the significant 
positive coefficient of Campaign*Post*ROA in column 2). However, this may not necessarily 
be the case for non-SOEs. Overall, the results from Table A6 reflect that the recent anti-
corruption campaign has placed more substantial constraint on SOE managers’ self-serving 
behaviour, and to some extent has caused the operational efficiency of SOEs to recover, 
which may be helpful to the whole Chinese economy and to social activities.  
Table A6  
The effect of political connections on performance, market reactions, perks and the pay-performance 
relationship around the anti-corruption campaign for the event firm sample  
This table presents the regression results of comparing the influence of political connections on 
performance, market reactions, perks and the pay-performance relationship before and after the anti-corruption 
campaign. Quarterly observations for the event firms from three years before to three years after the event of 
corruption are applied in Panel A. Cross-sectional observations are applied for CAR regression (Panel B). 
Yearly data is applied for both Panel C and Panel D. Definitions of all variables are as in previous tables.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error clustered by the firm. *, **and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 Full sample SOE sample Non-SOE sample 
Panel A: Firm performance regression (Dependent variable is ROA) 
Campaign 0.05*(1.93) 0.07*(1.72) -0.04(-0.95) 
Campaign*Post -0.03(-0.72) 0.04*(1.73) -0.10*(-1.78) 
Post -0.06***(-2.75) 0.02(0.69) -0.10***(-3.05) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
and industry and quarter fixed effects 
Chow test  4.88**  
Adjusted R square 0.20 0.22 0.28 
Observations 2261 1064 1197 
Panel B: Market reaction regression (Dependent variable is CARs) 
Campaign -0.01(-0.37) 0.04**(2.13) -0.05***(-2.78) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, leverage, tangible assets, sales, free cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
and industry fixed effects 
Chow test  6.98***  
Adjusted R square 0.15 0.13 0.15 
Observations 110 52 58 
Panel C: Perks regression (Dependent variable is ratio of perks to sales) 
Campaign -0.09(-0.78) -0.07(-0.86) -0.17(-0.83) 
Campaign*Post -0.71**(-2.18) -0.50**(-2.49) 0.71(1.36) 
Post -0.09(-0.53) -0.12(-1.14) 0.34(1.05) 
Control variables in each regression include return on assets, firm size, tangible assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, 
industry and year fixed effects 
Chow test  5.12**  
Adjusted R square 0.12 0.16 0.13 
Observations 523 272 251 
Panel D: Pay-performance regression (Dependent variable is the log of top three paid executives) 
Campaign -0.07(-0.84) -0.08(-1.09) 0.03(0.01) 
Campaign*ROA 0.10(0.10) 0.37*(1.68) -0.02(-0.51) 
Campaign*Post*ROA 0.07(1.42) 0.15***(3.04) 0.06(1.17) 
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ROA 0.57**(2.21) 0.13**(2.16) 0.66***(2.67) 
Control variables in each regression include firm size, tangible assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, board size, 
proportion of independent directors, industry and year fixed effects 
Chow test  4.13**  
Adjusted R square 0.17 0.19 0.26 
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